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Special
Reports
U.S. Notice 98-11 and the
Logic of Subpart F:
A Comparative Perspective

haven devices," for which deferral
was to be eliminated. 5
Thus, the assumption underlying subpart F was that a distinction could be drawn between two
types of foreign operations: (a)
active operating businesses, which

by Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah is an assistant professor of law at Harvard
Law School in Cambridge, Mass.
In this report, he argues that the dichotomy between active and
passive income that underlies subpart F and Notice 98-11 is obsolete,
and should be replaced with an explicit link to source tax rates, as
most of our trading partners do in similar legislation.

T

he debate about Notice 98-11
and the temporary regulations implementing it seems to be
an appropriate occasion for
asking whether the policy mix
underlying subpart F is still valid
36 years after its enactment. 1
(For the full text of Notice 98-11,
see Doc 98-2983 (6 pages).)
Raising policy questions seems
particularly appropriate since the
administration has asked Congress to ratify its actions in this
area through legislation,
although Congress currently
seems more inclined to overrule
the temporary regulations. 2
Subpart F was enacted in 1962
as a result of a compromise
between the Kennedy administration, which proposed terminating
deferral altogether, and Congress,
Tax Notes International

which "recognized the need to
maintain active American business operations abroad on an
equal competitive footing with
other operating businesses in the
same country."3 The legislative
history explains that "[y]our
committee's bill does not go as far
as the president's recommendations. It does not eliminate tax
deferral in the case of operating
businesses owned by Americans
which are located in the economically developed countries of the
world." 4
The floor debates, likewise,
constantly emphasize the distinction between "manufacturing or
similar operating company"
activities, which were to continue
benefiting from deferral, and "tax

1Notice 98-11, 1998-6 IRE 16; for the
debate on the notice, see, e.g., New York
State Bar Association, "Notice 98-11: Tax
Treatment of Hybrid Entities in the U.S.,"
Tax Notes Int'!, May 25, 1998, p. 1669, or
Doc 98-13191 (21 pages) ("the NYSBA
Report"); Cooper, Melcher, and Stretch,
"Suddenly Saving Foreign Taxes Is
Abusive? An Untenable Proposal," Tax
Notes Int'l, Mar. 9, 1998, p. 779, or Doc
98-8510 (8 pages); Gannon, Calianese et
al., "U.S. Subpart F, Hybrid Entities, and
Other Little Things," Tax Notes Int'l, May
4, 1998, p. 1467, or Doc 98-13237 (13
pages); Ganz and Strange, "Inclusion of
Subpart F Income Under Hybrid Branch
Regs - How the Regs Work," Tax Notes
Int'l, Apr. 27, 1998, p. 1332, or Doc
98-13280 (2 pages); Hariton, "Notice 98-11
Notwithstanding, What Should Be Done
With Subpart F?," Tax Notes Int'l, Apr. 6,
1998, p. 1089, or Doc 98-11437 (3 pages);
Sheppard, "Sweet Tax Nothings:
Rethinking U.S. Treasury's Foreign
Policy," Tax Notes Int'l, Apr. 20, 1998, p.
1229, or Doc 98-12099 (6 pages); Sheppard,
"U.S. Cross Border Tax Arbitrage, 'Hybridity,' Mules, and Hinnies," Tax Notes Int'/,
Feb. 23, 1998, p. 579, or Doc 98-6196 (11
pages).
2"Prescribe Regulatory Directive to
Address Tax Avoidance Through Use of
Hybrids," p. 144 of the General
Explanation of the Administration's
Revenue Proposals (Feb. 2, 1998).
3 S. Rep. No. 1881 at 83, 1962-3 C.B.
789; H.R. Rep. No. 1447, at 62, 1962-3 C.B.
461.
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were typically located in "economically developed countries" and
were therefore subject to significant positive foreign tax rates,
and (b) investment yielding
passive income and "base" companies, which (precisely because
they did not involve "real" business activities) could be earned in
jurisdictions offering low or zero
tax rates. Deferral was to be
allowed for the former category on
competitive grounds because the
foreign tax rate, while significant,
may be lower than the U.S. rate
and therefore a controlled foreign
corporation (CFC) would be at a
competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis
a local competitor paying only the
foreign tax. 6 Deferral was to be
denied in the latter case because
the combination of a low foreign
tax and deferral gave U.S. multinationals too much of an incentive
to invest abroad rather than at
home. 7
The fundamental problem
raised by subpart F today is that
this dichotomy, as envisaged by
Congress in 1962, is no longer
valid. Specifically, the assumption
that active business operations (as
opposed to passive income and
base company operations) cannot
be conducted in low-tax jurisdictions is incorrect. As oflast year,
there were 68 countries in the
world that offered "production tax
havens," i.e., special tax regimes
that grant temporary or permanent tax holidays to foreign investors conducting active business
operations therein. 8 From the
point of view of these countries,
the tax holiday is geared precisely
toward active manufacturing
operations, because those operations contribute to relieving
unemployment and the employees
gain valuable skills, which they
can carry with them to other jobs.
The main difference between such
production tax havens and traditional tax havens is that the tax
holidays are granted only to
foreign investors; local companies
and the local population are
subject to significant tax burdens,
which may even have to be raised
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to provide infrastructure and
other services to the foreign investors. Most of these production tax
havens were introduced since
1980, that is, long after the enactment of subpart F.
A specific example can perhaps
clarify how U.S. multinationals
benefit from production tax
havens. Intel Corporation, a
top-10 multinational, has major
manufacturing facilities outside
the United States in China,
Ireland, Israel, Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Puerto Rico. 9 All

The assumption that
active business
operations (as opposed
to passive income and
base company
operations) cannot be
conducted in low-tax
jurisdictions is incorrect.

of these manufacturing facilities
are located in countries that grant
tax holidays, but because the
activities therein are active business operations, they are not
subject to subpart F and the
income from these operations benefits from deferral. 10 The combination of deferral and cross-crediting
for income in the general basket
means that in most cases no U.S.
tax is ever levied on this income,
because even when it is eventually repatriated any residual U.S.
tax is eliminated by crosscrediting foreign taxes paid by
sales subsidiaries located in
high-tax jurisdictions. 11
This situation was not envisaged by the drafters of subpart F.

As the quotations above show, the
underlying assumption was that
active business operations could
not be conducted in low-tax jurisdictions. Otherwise, the
dichotomy between "tax haven
operations" and "legitimate manufacturing or similar operating
company" operations, which was
emphasized so much in the legislative history, makes no sense. 12
This explains why there is a "high
tax kick-out" provision in subpart
F, because Congress was aware
that some passive or holding
company income may be subject to

5See the quotations from the floor
debates reproduced in the Appendix to the
NYSBA Report.
6This argument assumes that taxes are
typically shifted forward to consumers
(and therefore the CFC would have higher
prices than its local competitor), which
seems questionable in light of the normal
incidence analysis for the income tax (i.e.,
that it falls on capital or sometimes labor).
7This is sometimes labeled "capital
export neutrality" or CEN. "Capital import
neutrality" or CIN, as mentioned in
Hariton and the NYSBA Report, refers to
equal treatment of investors in the same
country and therefore supports deferral.
CEN relates to neutrality in the location of
investment; CIN to neutrality in the
location of savings, if one assumes that
savings in the United States would be
lower because its multinationals are
subject to higher tax rates - a
questionable assumption, as the capital
gains debate has shown.

8Coopers & Lybrand, 1997
International Tax Summaries (1997). For
a fuller discussion of this phenomenon, see
Avi-Yonah, "International Taxation,
Electronic Commerce, and the Problem of
Tax Competition," 52 Tax Law Rev.
(Spring 1997 issue, forthcoming).
9http://www.intel.com/intel/inteli/sites.
htm.

10Tbe ability to defer the income from
such operations has been enhanced by the
repeal of section 956A.

11Tbis means that the United States is
effectively granting tax sparing to such
production tax havens, a situation that
would have made Stanley Surrey (one of
the architects of subpart F) extremely
unhappy.
12Appendix

to NYSBA Report.
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high foreign taxes, but there is no
"low tax kick-in." 13
It is instructive to compare
subpart F in this regard to similar
provisions in the legislation of our
major trading partners. Limitations on deferral or exemption of
certain types of income of controlled foreign corporations
(CFCs) were first introduced by
the United States in 1962, but
have since been adopted by all our
major trading partners (including
even countries that typically
exempt foreign-source income). 14
Perhaps because such legislation
was enacted later than subpart F
(and thus the other countries
could learn from our mistakes),
our trading partners tend to link
the deferral or exemption explicitly to the tax rate actually
imposed on the income abroad
(although some also link it to the
type of income involved).
For example, Japan grants
deferral only if the foreign operations are located in a jurisdiction
that has an effective tax rate over
25 percent; otherwise, all income
(active or passive) of a CFC is
subject to current taxation.
Sweden similarly allows deferral
only if a foreign corporation is
subject to tax in its resident state
in a manner comparable to
Swedish taxation; otherwise the
entity is treated as a passthrough
and all its income is taxed
currently. The United Kingdom
likewise eliminates deferral for
corporations subject to a "lower
level of taxation," defined as less
than 75 percent of the taxes the
corporation would have paid as a
U.K. resident (although there are
in this case significant exceptions
for active business operations).
Germany permits deferral if the
effective tax rate abroad (ignoring
operating losses and foreign tax
credits) is 30 percent or more,
although the rules apply only to
passive income. Australia has the
most recent set of rules, introduced in 1987. Its regime is based
on a "white list" of countries that
have significant effective tax
rates, for which deferral is
Tax Notes International

permitted, but even for countries
on the list income derived from
special regimes (such as tax holidays for foreign investors) may be
excluded. 15
Among exemption regimes,
Australia and Canada exempt
foreign-source dividends if the
income was earned in countries
where it is likely to have been
subject to tax. The French exemption likewise is conditioned on the
income being earned in a jurisdiction in which it is subject to an
effective tax rate not significantly

Our trading partners
tend to link deferral or
exemption explicitly to
the tax rate actually
imposed on
income abroad.

lower than the French rate, and
Germany has a similar rule. 16 It
should be noted, however, that
some of those countries (for
example, Germany) grant extensive tax-sparing credits in their
treaties, so that the limitations
apply only to treaty countries.
It is interesting to reconsider
Notice 98-11 against this background. The notice contains two
examples of how active income of
a CFC can escape foreign taxation
while also avoiding subpart F
inclusion. In both cases, the key is
a hybrid entity treated as a
branch under the check-the-box
regulations but as a separate
entity for foreign tax purposes. In
Example 1 in the notice, the CFC
borrows funds from a branch of its
foreign parent incorporated in the

same country as the CFC. The
branch is located in a low-tax
jurisdiction. For U.S. purposes,
the interest paid by the CFC is
considered paid to the holding
company and therefore is not
subject to subpart F because of
the same-country exception. 17 For
foreign purposes, the interest is
considered paid to a separate
entity and reduces the foreign tax
on the CFC's active income, while
not being subject to tax because
paid to a low-tax jurisdiction.
The second example in the
notice is even simpler: CFC
borrows from its own branch,
located in a low-tax jurisdiction.
For U.S. purposes the loan is
ignored because there can be no
loan from the taxpayer to itself;
for foreign purposes the branch is
a separate entity and the interest
is deductible in the CFC's jurisdiction and not subject to tax in the
branch's jurisdiction. Thus, in
both cases the high foreign tax
rate on the CFC's income has
been eliminated without triggering a subpart F inclusion.
What is not included in the
notice is a third example. Suppose
the CFC has simply been earning
active income in a production tax
haven. If the problem in examples
1 and 2 is reducing the foreign tax
rate on active income, why should
there be deferral in this example
3? Presumably, because Treasury
felt that including such an
example would exceed their authority to interpret subpart F, and

13See section 954(b)(4) (high tax
kick-out).
14The classic study is Arnold, The
Taxation of Controlled Foreign
Corporations: An International
Comparison (Canadian Tax Foundation
1986).
,
15Ault, Comparative Income Taxation
(Kluwer, 1997), 413-422.

16Ibid.,

411-413.

17 Section

954(c)(3).
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is best left to Congress. 18
However, if the analysis above is
correct and the purpose of subpart
F, like that of the corresponding
legislation of our trading partners,
was to eliminate deferral for
foreign income not subject to
significant tax abroad, then this
example is just as inconsistent
with that purpose as examples 1
and 2. 19

It thus seems that subpart F,
as currently enacted, is obsolete
and needs to be reformed. Short of
terminating deferral altogether,
the solution is to include a "low
tax kick-in" similar to those of our
trading partners, that is, subject
to current tax income of CFCs
(whether active or passive) that is
not taxed currently at 90 percent
of the section 11 rate. 20 Such a
move would be consistent with the
stated purpose of limiting deferral
to U.S. operations in "economically developed countries" with
significant tax rates, while eliminating it in the case of"tax
havens," including production tax
havens.
Objections to such legislation
would be made in the name of
competitiveness. 21 In particular,
some of the CFC regimes of our
trading partners (e.g., the United
Kingdom) do not apply to active
income earned in a low-tax jurisdiction (although some, like
Japan, do). In addition, some of
our trading partners (such as
Germany) grant tax-sparing
credits in their treaties. In those
cases, a CFC of a U.S. multinational operating, for example, in
Brazil would be subject to current
U.S. tax on its income while a
CFC of a German multinational in

1800 • June 8, 1998

Brazil would not be subject to
German tax under the GermanyBrazil tax treaty.
However, if this argument ever
made sense, it is doubtful that it
does now. 22 The OECD has
recently come out in a major
initiative designed to curb
harmful tax competition, defined
to include production tax havens.
In addition, the OECD also came
out against tax sparing, adopting
the long-held U.S. position with
the concurrence of Germany and
other traditional tax-sparing
advocates. In particular, the
OECD recommends that any
applicable limitations on deferral
in CFC legislation be given preference over tax-sparing provisions,
and that few, if any, new taxsparing provisions be negotiated. 23
Thus, it seems likely that ifwe
amend subpart F to include a
low-tax kick-in, our major trading
partners (and potential competitors) will follow our lead and not
grant deferral or exemption to
income earned in production tax
havens.
In 1962, the United States led
the world in limiting deferral to
income subject to tax abroad.
Unfortunately, the definition of
subpart F income has failed to
keep up with the rise of production tax havens, so that the
United States now lags behind its
trading partners in actually
taxing income earned abroad in
low-tax jurisdictions on a current
basis. The United States should
resume its leadership role in this
area by restricting deferral to
income that is subject to significant taxes abroad, as originally

envisaged by the drafters of
subpart F.

+

18Whether Treasury had authority for
examples 1 and 2 is a thorny issue
discussed at length in the NYSBA Report;
on balance, I believe they do, because the
transactions in those examples, defeat the
purpose of subpart F in precisely the situation envisaged by its drafters (active
income in a high-tax country converted to
passive income in a low-tax one).
19 One interesting question is why
would the CFC's country in examples 1
and 2 acquiesce in such earnings stripping.
Presumably the answer is that this is a
back-door way of granting a tax holiday
because politics preclude granting an
explicit one (or lowering rates generally).

20 1 would also favor terminating
deferral, especially now that it has become
elective because of the check-the-box
regulations. Such a move carries
significant simplification benefits. See
Avi-Yonah, "To End Deferral as We Know
It: Simplification Potential of Check-theBox," Tax Notes lnt'l, Dec. 30, 1996, p.
2207, or Doc 97-128 (12 pages).
21See,

e.g., Cooper et al., supra.

22As

noted above, the argument
assumes that taxes are passed on to
consumers and therefore the higher tax
rate faced by the U.S. CFC would make it
charge higher prices than the German
CFC facing a lower rate. The more likely
result is some reduction in the U.S.
parent's after-tax profit, but even this may
not happen if cross-crediting is allowed,
because then no residual U.S. tax will be
due on the subpart F income thanks to
available credits (as the discussion of
Notice 98-5 has shown, most U.S.
multinationals are currently in an excess
limitation position). (For the full text of
Notice 98-5, see Doc 98-175 (16 pages).)
23 Owens and Fensby, "Is There a Need
to Reevaluate Tax Sparing?" Tax Notes
Int'l, May 4, 1998, p. 1447, or Doc
98-13979 (2 pages); Tax Sparing: A
Reconsideration (OECD 1998).
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